One of Kaliski and Robshaw's algorithms, which is used for the linear attack on block ciphers with multiple linear approximations and introduced as Algorithm 2M in this paper, looks efficient but lacks any theoretical and mathematical description. It means there exists no way to estimate the data complexity required for the attack by the algorithm except experiments of the reduced variants. In this paper we propose a new algorithm using multiple linear approximation. We achieve the theoretical and mathematical analysis of its success probability. The new algorithm needs about 2 40.6 plaintexts to find 12 bits of secret key of 16-round DES with a success probability of about 86%.
Introduction
The linear attack on block ciphers uses a linear approximation with a probability. It was widely known by Matsui's attacks on DES [10] - [12] , and has been regarded as powerful as the differential attack [2] . As several variants of the differential attack have been developed, variants of the linear attack have also been studied.
Kaliski and Robshaw proposed a variant of the linear attack using multiple linear approximations. Their method effectively and naturally extends Matsui's Algorithm 1 with a linear approximation to Algorithm 1M with multiple linear approximations having the right-side of the same form. Algorithm 1M guesses 1 bit of the secret key with fewer plaintexts than Algorithm 1. In addition, it is well-supported by a mathematical analysis of the probability of its success.
On the other hand, Algorithm 2M which is derived from Algorithm 1M guesses the same number of key bits as Matsui's Algorithm 2. It is expected that Algorithm 2M requires fewer plaintexts than Algorithm 2. However, Algorithm 2M has no mathematical support about the probability of its success and the number of plaintexts. In other words, the statistic of Algorithm 2M doesn't give any mathematical analysis.
Our goal is to make a new statistic giving some mathematical analysis and to design a new attack algorithm using multiple linear approximations more efficient than Algorithm 1M. 
Our Contribution
Algorithm 2M looks like a natural extension of Algorithm 1M, but it lacks any theoretical and mathematical result. If we try to use Algorithm 2M to break a block cipher with a large secret key (e.g. 128 bits), the only way to estimate the data complexity is to simulate attacks on reduced round variants.
We give Algorithm RM whose success probability is mathematically supported by Theorem 1. We think that Theorem 1 is significant to estimate the amount of data required for the attack.
Our simulation of this algorithm on 8-round DES shows good results. It requires about 2 18 .73 known plaintexts to break 8-round DES with success probability 95%. This data complexity is smaller than Matsui's result in [10] by a factor of five.
We combine Knudsen and Mathiassen's chosen plaintext linear attack [7] with our algorithm to break 16-round DES. About 2 40.6 chosen plaintexts are required for the attack on 16-round DES with success probability 86%.
Related Work
Junod and Vaudenay [4] proposed a method to optimize the time complexity of M. Matsui's attack [12] in FSE 2003 which uses two linear approximations to have disjoint key bits. They extended it to the case of multiple linear approximations. Their key-ranking method efficiently minimize time complexity of search for right key in multiple key-lists.
Matsui's single-list ranking procedure is equivalent to a Neyman-Pearson Ranking Procedure and optimal in terms of the number of key tests from Theorem 1 in [4] . Our method uses multiple linear approximations having same key bits and is based on Matsui's single-list ranking procedure. So, Junod and Vaudenay's result is not an interesting issue in our paper. We are interested in making a new efficient attack algorithm by giving a new statistic and mathematically analyzing it.
Recently, Biryukov, Cannière, and Quisquater [1] suggested an elegant method to extend Matsui's algorithms with a linear approximation to algorithms with a multiple approximation. Their goal is almost same as ours. We think that the comparison of two researches with independent approaches would be interesting.
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Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces back grounds of linear attacks on block ciphers. In Section 3, our new algorithm is introduced and the analysis of it is given. Section 4 presents comparison of our algorithm and others. In Section 5, the results of attacks on 8-round and 16-round DES by our algorithm are presented. Some concluding remarks are made in Section 6.
Linear Attack on Block Ciphers

Matsui's Algorithms
Let X be a bit-string. X[i 1 , i 2 , ..., i j ] means the XOR sum of i 1 -th, i 2 -th, ..., i j -th bits of the string X. More generally, we use the notation X[χ X ] for the XOR sum of some bits of X.
The basic idea of linear attack is to find a linear approximation with a high bias from a targeted block cipher. Such a linear approximation has the following form.
where K is a key, P is a plaintext, and C is the ciphertext encrypted from P under K. If equation (1) is correct with probability p 1/2 for an encryption under a key, then we say that it has bias p − 1/2. We can guess the right-side of (1) by using Matsui's Algorithm 1 as follows. The guessed right-side is equivalent to one-bit of the secret key of the block cipher.
• Algorithm 1
Step 1 Let N be the total number of plaintexts. Let T be the number of (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs such that the left-side of equation (1) is equal to zero.
Step
Of more practical importance is Algorithm 2 † described in [11] which allows a cryptanalyst attacking DES to recover up to 13 bits of key information in the full 16-round DES. Generally, Algorithm 2 is more efficient than Algorithm 1. It uses a linear approximation with higher bias and guesses more bits of the secret key. The form of a linear approximation used for Algorithm 2 is as follows.
Indeed, it is a form of the linear approximation derived from Feistel block cipher with F-function but it is easy to make this form to be suitable for any block ciphers. Suppose that equation (2) is correct with probability p 1/2. If one substitutes an incorrect candidate for K 1 and K r in equation (2) , the effectiveness of this equation clearly decreases. Therefore, Matsui's Algorithm 2 can be applied to deduce K 1 , K r and K[χ K ] as follows.
• Algorithm 2
Step 1 Let N be the total number of plaintexts. Let K Step 2 Let T max be the maximum value and T min be the minimum value all T g,h 's.
- 
Matsui proved that the probability of the success of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is estimated with the number of plaintexts. It means we can decide approximately the number of plaintexts such that Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 succeeds with a certain probability.
Kaliski and Robshaw's Algorithms
Assume that we have n linear approximations in which leftsides are different but the right-side K[χ K ] is same. Each linear approximation for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is as follows.
For the sake of analysis, we suppose that each bias ε i = p i −1/2 is positive without loss of generality where equation (3) holds with probability p i 1/2 for each i.
• Algorithm 1M
Step 1 Let N denote the total number of plaintexts. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let T i be the number of (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs such that the left-side of equation (3) is equal to zero.
Step 2
Kaliski and Robshaw proved the probability of the success of Algorithm 1M depends on the number of plaintexts, and established the formula of the probability. It means we can estimate the number of plaintexts such that Algorithm 1M succeeds with a certain probability. As Matsui's Algorithm 2 is extended from Algorithm † In Algorithm 2 proposed in [10] , a cryptanalyst approximates (r − 1) iterations of the F-function from the first to the (r − 1) th round and find 7 bits of effective key information. Algorithm 2 in [11] is an improved version of Algorithm 2 in [10] .
1, more efficient Algorithm 2M is extended from Algorithm 1M. It usea n linear approximations and the i-th linear equation for 1 ≤ i ≤ n have the following form.
We assume that every
] is affected by same key bits and that each bias ε i is positive.
We specify two assumptions used for Algorithm 2M as follows. 
Assumption 1: For the wrong key pair (K
(g) 1 , K (h) r ), T i g,h s(1 ≤ i ≤ n) are identical
Assumption 2:
For the right key pair (K
are independent random variables each having a normal density with mean µ i = N p i and variance
Normally, the first assumption is regarded as reasonable and acceptable. None can be sure that the second assumption is right because indeed, the linear approximations may be so complicatedly related that we cannot find the relationship, rather than independent. However, according to many previous experimental results of linear attacks on block ciphers, the right key pair is found around the key pair having the highest statistic. So, we can accept the second assumption.
We consider these two assumptions for our new algorithm.
• Algorithm 2M
Step 1 Let N be the total number of plaintexts. Let K (4) is equal to zero when K 1 is replaced by K
Step 2 Calculate U g,h = n i=1 w i T i g,h for each g, h where each ε i is the bias of the i-th linear approximation and
Step 3 Let U max be the maximum value and U min be the minimum value of all U g,h 's.
- That is, no theoretically specific relationship between their success probability and data complexity is found.
New Algorithm RM
It is a necessary condition to apply Algorithm 1M or 2M that all linear approximations have the same right-side K[χ K ] and the same key pair. However this condition restricts the use of Algorithm 1M or 2M. The suggested and welldesigned block ciphers in recent years are not likely to have linear approximations with relatively great bias which satisfy such a condition. Algorithm 2M and extended algorithms which use any multiple approximation have no specific results about the relationship between the success probability and the amount of the plaintexts. Our approach for this problem is to exclude the guess of the right-sides. We consider multiple linear approximation as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
] is affected by same key bits. Given the multiple approximation (5), we use Algorithm RM as follows.
• Algorithm RM
Step 1 Let N be the total number of plaintexts. Let K Step
. For each g, h, cal-
Step 3 Let U max be the maximum value of all U g,h 's. The K Note that n linear approximations used in Algorithm RM have the same key pair (K 1 , K r ). To determine the complexity of Algorithm RM,
(c : a constant greater than 1) determines the number of required plaintexts in Algorithm RM by our simulations and analyses. For example, the success rate of Algorithm RM is about 94%∼97% with 8/ n i=1 ε 2 i plaintexts. Also, we could know the probability density function of
i is denoted by E. The following theorem states the relationship between the success probability of Algorithm RM and the number of plaintexts.
Theorem 1: Let
where w i 's are the weights mentioned in Algorithm RM. Then the success rate of Algorithm RM is about
where Γ is the gamma function, the product is taken over all candidates (K 
Comparison of Algorithm 2, Algorithm 2M, and Algorithm RM
In this section, we compare Algorithm 2, Algorithm 2M, and Algorithm RM with experiments on DES. We consider the following approximations. (7) and (8) were used for simulations of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm RM on 4-round DES, and (9) and (10) were used for simulations of Algorithm 2, Algorithm 2M and Algorithm RM on 7-round DES. Note that the number of the key bits recovered by Algorithm RM is one bit fewer than Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 2M. (7) and (8) have different right-sides, and so are used for the comparison of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 2M. Table 1 shows the results of Algorithm 2 using (7), and (8) separately and of Algorithm RM using (7) and (8) on 4 round DES. Here, E is two times as large as the square of each bias. Clearly, we can observe that Algorithm RM requires less known plaintexts for the same success probability than Algorithm 2. Notice that Algorithm 2 guesses 7 key bits including the value of the right-side, while Algorithm RM guesses 6 key bits. Table 2 shows the the results of Algorithm 2 using (9) and (10) separately, Algorithm 2M using (9) and (10), and Algorithm RM using (9) and (10) on 7 round DES. From this experiment we believe that Algorithm 2M and RM have the same results under the situation where Algorithm 2M is available. Notice that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 2M guesses 13 key bits including the value of the right-side, while Algorithm RM guesses 12 key bits.
Through these comparison, we want to stress that the statistic of Algorithm RM is as good as that of Algorithm 2M.
Attacks on 8-Round and 16-Round DES
Attack on 8 Round DES
To attack on 8-round DES, we found 139 7-round linear approximations with |ε i | > 0.00003 available to guess effective key bits of S1-box on 8-round DES. The reason why we only consider S1-box is that 139 i=1 ε 2 i ≈ 0.00001838 is the biggest value among ε 2 i of 8 DES S-box(S1∼S8). This value is 5.06 times as large as ε 2 of the 7-round linear approximation with the best probability in [10] . Table 3 shows the comparison of the experimental results and the theoretical results of Algorithm RM using 139 7-round linear approximations. If we use 139 linear approximations the number of required known plaintexts used to Algorithm RM is five times as small as it used to Algorithm 2 [10] for the same success rate. For instance, the number of required known plaintexts used to Algorithm 2 is 2,206,072 for the 96.7%, but the number of required known plaintexts used to Algorithm RM is 435,200 for the same success prob- ability.
Attack on 16 Round DES
We found 14-round linear approximations for attack on full round DES. There were 3 linear approximations available to find the 6 effective key bits of S1-box and the 6 effective key bits of S5-box on 16-round DES. If we use 3 linear approximations where
, then the number of required known plaintexts used for Algorithm RM may be about 1.25 times as small as the number of required known plaintexts (2 43 ) used to Algorithm 2 in LC using a 14-round linear approximation with the best probability(1/2 − 1.19 × 2 −21 ). As we already refer to a chosen-plaintext linear attack [6] introduced by Knudsen and Mathiassen in introduction, we will find multiple linear approximations for full round DES by using chosen plaintexts in order to get the best data complexity as possible. They use the linear approximation which has the following form.
A, B, and D denote special XOR sums of a bit string.
The linear approximations used by Knudsen and Mathiassen are as follows. Let X be any sting of 32 bits.
• A 1 = X [7, 18, 24] , B 1 = X [7, 18, 24, 29] ,
Note that two linear approximations for i = 1 and 2 involve the identical effective key bits.
To combine our work with their method, we could find four more 13-round approximations that involve the identical effective key bits with the same as two linear approximations used by Knudsen and Mathiassen. The four linear approximations founded by us are as followings.
• A 3 = X [7, 24] , B 3 = X [7, 24, 29] ,
If we calculate the bias of each linear approximation for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, we get Depending on these values, we estimate the number of required chosen plaintexts for Algorithm RM using 6 linear approximations will be about 2 40.6 for 86% success probability. 2 40.6 chosen plaintexts have the following property: To achieve plaintexts used in our attack we need to fix 22 bits of the right half of the all plaintexts. The fixed positions are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 15 ∼ 31.
Conclusion
We introduced Algorithm RM as a new algorithm used for linear attack on block cipher with a multiple approximation. By Theorem 1, we showed the specific relationship between the success probability and the data complexity of Algorithm RM. Our results for DES are summerized as follows.
• Algorithm RM needs about 2 18.73 known plaintexts on 8-round DES to find 6 key bits with a success probability of about 95%. The number 2 18.73 is five times as small as the number of required known plaintexts (2, 206, 072) in linear cryptanalysis [10] suggested by M. Matsui in 1993.
• Algorithm RM needs about 2 40.6 chosen plaintexts on 16-round DES to find 12 key bits with a success probability of 86%. The number 2 40.6 is 5.28 times as small as the number of required known plaintexts (2 43 ) in linear cryptanalysis [12] suggested by M. Matsui in 1994.
These results have a single key list. If we get multiple linear approximations having multiple key-lists like [12] , then we can combine Algorithm RM with Junod and Vaudenay's key-ranking method [4] . By the way each of weights approximates to 1/n if we calculate it from the bias of linear approximations used in practical attacks. So we can use the following relation
to give a theoretical analysis for wrong effective keys.
for each i is independent random variable having the normal density N(0, (
2 for all i is the gamma density with parameters α w = 1 2 and λ w = 2(
by Lemma 1. Then the density of
2 has the gamma density
We consider the statistic
Then sb ≥ t 2 by Cauchy-Schwartz Inequality. Then we can get the following relation.
Therefore the effective key candidate K i g,h for the i-th approximation will be wrong if the value of
Because b is a constant value, s and t are the variables affected by the variation of T i g,h . We have shown that the lower bound of the sum of s, t, and b is s + √ sb + b as above inequality. To figure out the probability density function (pdf) of the sum of s, t, and b, we examine the pdf of the variable s that decides the lower bound of the sum of s, t, and b. 
